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Abstract 
 
This Article advances a proposal that brings to life valuable lawsuits that 
litigation costs currently discourage. Our proposal converts claims with 
negative expected values into positive expected value claims by implementing 
a novel system involving flexible conditional multipliers. Our proposal has 
two components. First, under the proposed system a plaintiff is allowed to 
select a damage multiplier that determines the amount of damages the 
plaintiff will receive if the litigation is successful. Second, courts select cases 
for litigation randomly with a probability inverse to the multiplier the 
plaintiff selected.  
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1      Introduction 
 
Frivolous lawsuits, punitive damage awards, and large jury verdicts 
create the perception that society is excessively litigious.1 Recent 
theoretical and empirical evidence suggest, however, that the increased 
complexity and costs of litigation may deter the pursuit of meritorious 
claims in various areas of law.2 Instances in which litigation costs 
outweigh the expected benefits of trial are no longer the exclusive 
territory of small claim disputes. High cost-to-value litigation ratios are 
now common in patent law,3 corporate law, and mass tort disputes, 
among others.4  
The possibility of suboptimal levels of litigation raises a number of 
concerns. Standard models of litigation predict that a plaintiff will file a 
lawsuit only if the expected benefits of a trial outweigh the expected costs. 
If the litigation costs outweigh the expected benefits of trial, a potential 
plaintiff will not file a lawsuit, even if the probability of winning is high. 
Consequently, if too few claims are pursued in court the deterrent effect 
of the legal system is undermined. For instance, if there is no credible 
threat of facing financial repercussions, too few potential tortfeasors 
invest adequately in precaution, leading to higher overall accident rates.5  
Especially if tortfeasors are in a position to prevent certain accident 
losses at low costs, the absence of a reasonable expectation of facing a 
lawsuit is problematic. In such circumstances, creating positive value 
suits can lead to substantial welfare gains.  
This Article seeks to resolve the issue of suboptimal levels of litigation 
by implementing a novel system of litigation. Our proposal has two 
components. First, we propose that a plaintiff is allowed to select a 
damage multiplier that determines the amount of damages he or she will 
                                                
1  See, e.g., Galanter, 1983; Barnes, 1993. 
2 See Hylton (1991, 2002); Hersch & Viscusi (2007). 
3 Landes (2004); Simensky & Osterberg, (1991). 
4 Burbank (1987). 
5 An inadequate amount of lawsuits may occur because a plaintiff does not 
adequately take into account the positive effect of his lawsuit on the deterrent 
function of the tort system. This problem will be acute when the social benefits of 
a lawsuit outweigh the private gains of the plaintiff (Shavell, 1982) A RAND 
study estimates that only 1 in 10 injuries result in attempts to collect liability 
compensation. See Hensler (1991). Note that, because of the additional costs of 
litigation, proposals to stimulate legal claims do not necessarily increase social 
welfare overall. See Shavell (1982) (explaining the misalignment between private 
and social incentives to bring lawsuits).  
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receive if the litigation is successful. Second, we propose that courts 
randomly select cases for litigation with a probability inverse to the 
multiplier the plaintiff selected. In essence, this proposal introduces a 
flexible damage multiplier that inversely affects the probability of 
adjudication.  
The advantages of the proposal are threefold. First, by reducing the 
costs of litigation relative to the gains, a multiplier creates a credible 
threat to sue for some individuals that would otherwise not pursue claims 
that have substantial merit. Consequently, the deterrent function of the 
legal system is improved. Second, the proposal reaches this objective 
without inducing excessive precautions. Because the random element of 
adjudication is set off against the increased damages of the multiplier, the 
expected loss of a suit remains more or less equal for the defendant.6 
Third, the proposed system  has the advantage of providing plaintiffs the 
opportunity to self-select the optimal multiplier. The optimal multiplier 
may strongly differ from plaintiff to plaintiff, depending inter alia on 
varying risk attitudes and differences in litigation costs between the 
plaintiff and defendant in a dispute (see Part 5 below).  
A potential downside of our proposal is that, by converting claims with 
negative expected values into positive expected value claims, litigation costs 
may increase. However, the potential increase in litigation costs is mitigated, 
to some degree, by the fact that our mechanism eliminates a fraction of the 
claims that are currently filed. Also, the increased level of deterrence should 
reduce the overall accident rate. Finally, in order to further mitigate 
increased litigation costs and reduce the amount of weak and frivolous 
claims, we consider including a maximum multiplier in the proposed system.  
We proceed as follows. Part 2 describes the proposal and outlines the 
main effects. Part 3 contains a formal exposition of our proposal. Part 4 
discusses a number of possible objections to our proposal and suggests 
some possible modifications to the proposal. Part 5 compares the 
advantages and disadvantages of our system to two alternative systems 
involving multipliers. Part 6 concludes.      
 
 
                                                
6 This stands in contrast to systems of “pure multipliers” that do not randomize 
litigation. In a pure multiplier system, there is a risk that the multiplier will be 
set either too low (leading to inadequate precautions) or too high (leading to 
excessive precautions). A multiplier that brings about first-best deterrence must 
be chosen by striking a balance between the supply of lawsuits and the need to 
internalize costs. See Hylton & Miceli, 2005.  
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2      Proposal 
 
Our proposed system of probabilistic litigation consists of two steps. 
First, under the litigation model, a plaintiff is allowed to select a damage 
multiplier that determines the amount of damages he or she will receive 
if the litigation is successful. Second, courts randomly select cases for 
litigation  with a probability inverse to the multiplier the plaintiff 
selected. 
To explain the mechanism and effects of this model of litigation, 
consider the following numerical example. Suppose there are two groups 
of victims seeking compensatory damages for accident losses. Victims in 
Group 1 face trial costs of $50, while victims in Group 2 would incur $100 
in trial costs. The following conditions apply to both groups: (1) All 
victims have suffered a compensable harm of $100; (2) all victims have a 
70% probability of obtaining compensation in trial (assume further that 
the plaintiff and defendant share this estimate), (3) the trial costs for the 
defendant are $50, and finally (4) each litigant bears his or her own trial 
costs, as is the case under the American rule. Accordingly, victims in 
Group 1 will have a credible threat to litigate: the expected value of trial 
is positive (0.7x$100 – $50 = $20). Victims in Group 2 will not go to trial: 
the expected value of litigation is negative for this group (0.7x$100 – $100 
= -$30). Although victims in both groups have a meritorious claim (70% 
chance of success in litigation), only the first group has a credible threat 
to litigate. As a result, only potential plaintiffs in Group 1 are likely to 
receive a settlement offer.  
By contrast, under our proposed model of litigation, victims in both 
groups have a credible threat to litigate. The mechanism works as 
follows: first, a plaintiff is allowed to select a damage multiplier which 
determines the amount of damages he or she will receive in case of 
successful litigation. For example, if the victim selects a multiplier of 3, 
he or she will not receive $100 but $300. Second, a victim is only allowed 
to bring the case to trial with a probability that equals the 
(multiplicative) inverse of the selected multiplier. In our example, the 
victim will have a 33.3% (1/3) chance that the case will be allowed to 
proceed to trial. Thus, there is a probability of 66.6% that the case will 
not be selected for adjudication. Returning to the example above, note 
that Group 2 will be offered a positive settlement amount under our 
proposal if they select a multiplier of 3. Consider also that the settlement 
amount approximates the expected judgment ($70). The expected value of 
trial in Group 2 thus increases from -$30 to $36.67 (1/3x(0.7x$300 – 100)), 
with a 1/3 probability that the case will go to court. In that case, the 
victim has a 70% chance of obtaining $300 (3x100) while incurring trial 
6 
 
costs of $100. However, there is  a 2/3 probability that  the plaintiff will 
not be allowed to pursue his claim in court. In that event, the plaintiff is 
left empty-handed. Meanwhile, the defendant’s expected losses under our 
system equal $86.67 (1/3x(0.7x$300 + $50)) when faced with plaintiffs 
from Group 2. If the parties divide the settlement surplus equally, a 
victim in this group will likely receive a settlement amount of $61.67.   
For an intuitive explanation of our proposal, consider how the 
plaintiffs’ expected benefits of the litigation remain identical, irrespective 
of the magnitude of the damage multiplier selected by the plaintiff. This 
is because the selected multiplier and the inverse probability of trial have 
a canceling effect. In the example above, if the plaintiff selects a 
multiplier of 3, the expected benefit equals $70 (1/3 x 0.7 x $300). If the 
plaintiff selects a multiplier of 5, the expected benefits remain at $70 (1/5 
x 0.7 x $500). At the same time, while the expected benefits remain at the 
same level, the expected costs of litigation decrease with relative 
increases of the selected damage multiplier. Higher multipliers reduce 
the probability that the case will be selected for litigation and, 
consequently, that trial costs will be incurred. In the absence of a damage 
multiplier, the expected cost of litigation is $100 for the plaintiff. With a 
damage multiplier of 3, litigation costs are adjusted by the reduced 
(33.3%) probability of the claim being selected for litigation, reducing the 
(expected) costs to $33.33 (100/3). If the plaintiff selects a multiplier of 10, 
the expected costs are further reduced to $10 (100/10). In summary, the 
combination of a damage multiplier and an inversely related probability 
of adjudication does not affect the benefits of litigation, yet it decreases 
the costs thereof. Thus, the overall effect is an increase in the expected 
value of the plaintiff’s claim. Larger multipliers lead to higher expected 
values of trial because they lower the expected trial costs. Overall, our 
proposal brings to life legal actions that have merit, which would 
normally be deterred because of the prohibitive costs relative to the 
potential gains.  
At first glance, one may fear that this system will be detrimental to 
potential tortfeasors, prompting them to take excessive precautionary 
measures in order to prevent liability. Indeed, injurers may ultimately be 
held liable for amounts that exceed the actual harm for which they are 
responsible. Note, however, that the opportunity to litigate is limited to a 
probability that is inversely related to the damage multiplier. For 
example, even if the plaintiff selects a multiplier of 5, the expected loss 
for the defendant “merely” equals $80 (1/5 x (0.7 x 500 + 50)).  If the 
plaintiff has a positive expected value claim to begin with, then the 
expected loss of the defendant would have been greater without the 
application of a multiplier: 0.7x100 + 50 = $120. Also, it is important to 
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recognize that most parties will settle prior to the selection of a 
multiplier.    
How will the current proposal affect the behavior of potential litigants? 
By selecting a multiplier, a plaintiff creates a credible threat of initiating 
a lawsuit. For this reason, many defendants will be inclined to settle as 
soon as the plaintiff selects a multiplier. In fact, the mere availability of a 
multiplier may be sufficient to induce settlement offers. At the very least, 
a plaintiff will select the lowest possible multiplier that is sufficiently 
capable of creating a credible threat of litigation to the defendant. As the 
formal exposition in Part 3 demonstrates, a risk-neutral plaintiff will 
often select the highest possible multiplier. This offers two benefits to the 
plaintiff. First, selecting the highest possible multiplier minimizes the 
expected costs of the plaintiff. As a result, a plaintiff’s expected value is 
maximized in the event that the case is selected for trial. Second, a high 
multiplier may maximize a defendant’s settlement offer if the plaintiff’s 
trial costs exceed those of the defendant. Because higher multipliers 
reduce the difference between parties’ expected trial costs, a high 
multiplier particularly benefits the party that has the highest litigation 
costs. As a practical reality however, risk-averseness will prompt a 
plaintiff to select a relatively modest multiplier. Because risk-averse 
individuals prefer certain outcomes to more uncertain ones (even if the 
expected benefits are identical), risk-averse plaintiffs will be sensitive to 
the probability of not being selected for trial.  
A recent article by Rosenberg and Shavell, which introduces a clever 
system of random adjudication (50%) with double damages, inspired our 
proposal.7 Although we share the underlying idea of introducing a random 
element to adjudication,8 our proposed system is fundamentally different 
in terms of normative orientation and implementation. First, rather than 
attempting to reduce the amount of litigation, we set out to increase the 
overall access to the legal system. Second, our proposal aims to improve 
the deterrent effect of the tort system by bringing to life so-called 
negative value suits that have merit but that are not currently filed 
because of litigation costs. By contrast, the proposal by Rosenberg and 
Shavell targets cases that would be filed regardless of the merits.9 Third, 
                                                
7 Rosenberg & Shavell, 2005 (proposing a system of random adjudication with 
double damages).  
8 Both proposals adapt to the context of litigation fundamental law enforcement 
policy insights. See Becker (1968) (explaining the fundamental trade-off in 
enforcement policy between the levels of certainty and severity of sanctions) and 
Miller (1997) (showing that litigants might settle after agreeing to participate in a 
lottery). Both are cited in Rosenberg & Shavell, 2005, 1722, fn. 2. 
9 We stress that our system could also be of use for positive expected value suits, 
especially litigation involving relatively high trial costs (see further).  
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our proposal introduces a multiplier selected by the plaintiff rather than 
a system of double damages with conditional adjudication. We discuss the 
advantages of flexibility in Part 5.   
 
 
3      Model 
 
In this Part we present a formal exposition of our proposal.  
 
3.1   Assumptions and Notations 
    
Throughout the analysis we apply the following notations:  
Pp = the estimation by the plaintiff of the plaintiff’s chance of success 
Pd = the estimation by the defendant of the plaintiff’s chance of success 
J = the damage award 
Cp = the trial costs of the plaintiff 
Cd = the trial costs of the defendant 
M = the multiplier chosen by the plaintiff 
S = the settlement amount (after the choice of a multiplier) 
We adopt the following assumptions. Both parties are risk neutral, 
filing and settling a lawsuit is costless (separate from litigation costs, 
which are positive), parties know one another’s estimation of the 
plaintiff’s probability of success at trial (and there is no asymmetric 
information on other aspects as well),10 11 the litigation expenditures of 
                                                
10 More precisely, the estimations are common knowledge.   
11 Note that the assumption that litigation costs are observable between the 
parties may be more plausible in some settings than in others. When a 
substantial fraction of the litigation costs are psychological in nature for instance, 
costs are most likely to be non-observable (and non-verifiable to a third-party 
court). However, when both parties have information ex ante of the merits of the 
case (but the court doesn’t) and determine their expenditures in light of these 
merits (and of course the amount at stake etc.), then the parties may know ex 
ante how much they will spend, while the court does not. For a rent seeking model 
of litigation in which the true degree of fault is known by both litigants but is not 
known by the court, see Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) and Farmer and Pecorino 
(1999). Introducing the possibility of asymmetric information increases the overall 
complexity. For example, if the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing or his trial 
costs are private information (e.g. when psychological costs are substantial for 
some plaintiffs but not for others), the plaintiff’s choice of the multiplier M may 
serve as a signal that affects subsequent settlement negotiations. For example, 
the plaintiff may want to select M in order to signal toughness in bargaining and 
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the parties are fixed, and both parties bear their individual trial costs. If 
the parties settle, they divide the surplus equally (this is the Nash 
bargaining solution).12 These assumptions are relaxed at the more 
advanced stages of the model. 
 Let us first describe how our proposal fits within the chronology of 
legal disputes. Following standard procedure, after a claim has been filed, 
parties will either settle the dispute or proceed to trial. If the disputants 
move to trial and the plaintiff wins the case, the plaintiff obtains a 
damage award. By contrast, in our proposed system, after a suit is filed 
and the parties do not settle,13 a plaintiff has the option of selecting a 
multiplier. A lottery system subsequently determines whether the 
plaintiff is allowed to litigate the claim.14 If the case is not selected for 
litigation, the legal dispute ends. If the plaintiff’s case is randomly 
selected, the parties are provided with another opportunity to settle the 
case. If parties fail to reach a settlement agreement, the dispute proceeds 
to trial. If the plaintiff prevails in litigation, the plaintiff receives a 
damage award that is multiplied by the selected multiplier.  
  
 
3.2  The Selection of the Damage Multiplier by the Plaintiff 
 
Currently, a plaintiff cannot credibly threaten to litigate if Cp > Pp.J. In 
such instance, a defendant will not make a settlement offer. Following 
our proposal, a plaintiff can select a multiplier M. If a multiplier is 
selected, the plaintiff has a probability of 1/M that the claim will be 
selected for litigation. If the case is randomly selected for trial, the 
expected value of the claim is Pp.M.J – Cp and the expected losses of the 
defendant equal Pd.M.J + Cd.  After the plaintiff selects a certain M and is 
allowed to proceed, the parties will settle if, and only if, Pd.M.J + Cd ≥ 
                                                                                                               
credibility in proceeding to trial. While many analyses of litigation apply the more 
sophisticated asymmetric information model, we apply the relative optimism 
model- mainly for the purpose of simplicity. Empirical research suggests that both 
relative optimism and asymmetric information cause bargaining failures. See, 
e.g., Waldfogel (1998); Osborne (1999). Further on we will stress that more refined 
models (including asymmetric information, but also models involving endogenous 
litigation costs, court error, risk costs etc.) could help to shed more light on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the several systems that could be advanced to 
convert negative value suits. 
12 This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity. Alternatively, one could 
introduce a parameter reflecting the relative bargaining power of the plaintiff.  
13 If the parties settle at this stage, they do so in light of the multiplier that they 
expect that the plaintiff might select (they will settle for an amount between Pp.J 
– Cp/M and Pd.J + Cd/M). 
14 We assume that the parties are informed of the result of the lottery 
immediately.  
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Pp.M.J – Cp.15 This equation can be rewritten as follows: Cp + Cd ≥ (Pp-
Pd).M.J.  If a settlement is reached, the likely settlement amount consists 
of Pp.M.J – Cp + ½.(Pd.M.J + Cd – Pp.M.J + Cp).16   
Let us examine the expected gains of the plaintiff for any given 
multiplier M. If the parties go to trial, the expected value of a plaintiff 
that selects a certain M equals: 1/M.(Pp.M.J-Cp) + (1-1/M).0 = Pp.J – Cp/M. 
If the plaintiff selects an M amount that is likely to induce a settlement, 
the plaintiff expects to obtain 1/M.(Pp.M.J – Cp + ½.(Pd.M.J + Cd – Pp.M.J 
+ Cp) + (1-1/M).0 = Pp.J + ½.(Pd.J – Pp.J + (Cd-Cp)/M). We can distinguish 
between the following conditions: 
 
Condition 1: If Pp ≤ Pd, the parties will always settle after the plaintiff 
has selected a certain M, regardless of the M selected by the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff will choose M to maximize: 
          
          
(1) 
 
What multiplier will a risk neutral plaintiff likely select?  At a 
minimum, M must be high enough to bring the legal claim into a positive 
expected value range. Hence, the minimum multiplier (Mmin) must satisfy 
Pp.M.J – Cp ≥ 0 or Mmin = Cp/(Pp.J). Whether the plaintiff will select an M 
greater than Mmin depends on the relative litigation costs of both parties. 
If the costs of trial are higher for the plaintiff than for the defendant 
(Cp>Cd), the plaintiff will select the highest possible multiplier (Mmax).17 A 
larger multiplier reduces the difference between the expected trial costs 
of both parties. In formal terms, S raises with increases of M: 
 
                                                
15 Note that, in our model, if the parties intend to settle after the selection of a 
multiplier, they will already have settled before the plaintiff selects the multiplier 
since Pd.M.J + Cd ≥ Pp.M.J – Cp  Pd.J + Cd/M ≥ Pp.J – Cp/M. Clearly, the pre-
lottery settlement amount will be situated halfway between Pp.J – Cp/M and Pd.J 
+ Cd/M, with M being equal to the multiplier that the parties expect that the 
plaintiff will select.  
16 This is the Nash bargaining solution.  
17 Mmax could be imposed by law (see further). If not, a risk neutral plaintiff would 
choose an infinitely high M. 
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(2) 
 
Conversely, if the defendant’s litigation costs exceed those of the 
plaintiff (Cd ≥ Cp), the plaintiff will select Mmin. That is true because any 
further increase of M benefits the defendant more than the plaintiff.18 
Formally, S decreases or remains the same with increases of M: 
 
  
     (3) 
 
Condition 2: If Pp > Pd, the decision to settle depends on the selection of 
M.  
 
If the plaintiff decides on an M > (Cp+Cd)/(Pp-Pd).J, the parties will 
proceed to trial. In such instance, the plaintiff is best served by 
maximizing Pp.J – Cp/M. The plaintiff will select an M that is as high as 
possible (Mmax) and will expect to gain Pp.J – Cp/Mmax. If the plaintiff 
selects an M ≤ (Cp+Cd)/(Pp-Pd).J, the parties will settle. If Cp>Cd, the 
plaintiff will select a maximum M, equaling (Cp+Cd)/(Pp-Pd).J.19  We 
denote this maximum as M'max. The plaintiff thus expects to gain Pp.J – 
Cp/M'max.20 When Cp≤Cd, the plaintiff selects Mmin. The plaintiff thus 
expects to gain ½.(Pd.J + Cd/Mmin).21 It is necessary to distinguish between 
two sub-conditions: 
 
Condition 2.A. If Cp>Cd, the plaintiff balances Pp.J – Cp/Mmax with Pp.J 
– Cp/M'max. The plaintiff will choose Mmax and the parties will go to trial if 
                                                
18 Actually, when Cp=Cd, the plaintiff will be indifferent. 
19 Since we consider the case M ≤ (Cp+Cd)(Pp-Pd).J. 
20 When the plaintiff chooses M’max, the expected value of the plaintiff equals the 
expected loss of the defendant, since for any M  ≤ M'max the parties settle and for 
any M > M'max the parties litigate. Consequently, the settlement surplus is equal 
to zero at M'max. 
21 When the plaintiff chooses Mmin, his expected value of trial is zero (by definition 
of Mmin). 
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Mmax > M'max. When M’max > Mmax, the plaintiff will select Mmax and the 
parties will settle. 
 
Condition 2.B. If Cp ≤ Cd, the plaintiff balances Pp.J – Cp/Mmax with 
½.(Pd.J + Cd/Mmin). Since Mmin = Cp/Pp.J, the plaintiff will select Mmin and 
the parties will settle when (Pp- ½.Pd).J ≤ Cp/Mmax + (Cd/Cp).Pp.J. Since 
Cd≥Cp, this is always true. In other words, if Cp ≤ Cd, the plaintiff will 
select Mmin and the parties settle.  
 
3.3. Risk Aversion and Endogenous Trial Expenditures 
 
Risk-averse plaintiffs will be particularly sensitive to the possibility that 
their claims will not be selected for trial. Due to this concern, risk-averse 
plaintiffs will generally favor a lower M; i.e. a risk-averse plaintiff is 
unlikely to select Mmax.22 As the plaintiff’s level of risk aversion increases, 
the optimal M for a risk-averse plaintiff moves closer to Mmin. More 
formally, the plaintiff will increase M as long as the marginal benefits 
from an increase (larger settlement amount or larger expected value of 
trial) outweigh the marginal costs of risk.23 24 
    A multiplier system increases the stakes of litigation. The expenditures 
on claims selected for trial will increase accordingly. If a plaintiff’s case is 
selected for trial, the plaintiff in our proposal has a greater incentive to 
win and will spend more time and resources to obtain (multiplied) 
damages. Likewise, a defendant will have an increased incentive to win 
the case. If a plaintiff increases his or her trial expenditures in proportion 
to the increased stakes (from Cp to M.Cp), the lawsuit retains its negative 
expected value. After selecting M and receiving permission to proceed, the 
expected value of the plaintiff will remain negative:25 
 
Pp.M.J – M.Cp = M. (Pp.J – Cp) < 0               (4) 
 
                                                
22 Note that if plaintiffs could assign their rights, risk aversion would disappear 
and plaintiffs would prefer higher multipliers. The assignment of rights is 
disallowed in most jurisdictions.   
23 Risk aversion may increase the settlement frequency in at least two ways. First, 
the costs of risk may widen the settlement range. Second, risk aversion induces 
lower multipliers and thus decreases the amounts at stake. Having smaller 
amounts at stake reduces the chance that relative optimism will lead to litigation.    
24 On the influence of risk aversion on behalf of the defendant, see below. 
25 For the sake of simplicity, we hold Pp constant.  
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   Although expenditures are likely to rise, the overall increase of 
litigation expenditures will generally be lower than the increase of the 
stakes. This follows from the assumption that parties will initially make 
the most worthwhile legal investments. In other words, the marginal 
return of the investment decreases as a litigant makes additional 
investments. Empirical research suggests that the expenditures of the 
parties rise at a lower rate than increases of the amount awarded in 
settlements or at trial.26 
 
 
 
4      Potential Objections 
 
(1) The proposal is unfair to plaintiffs. One could argue that the 
proposed system is unfair because not all plaintiffs are treated equally: 
some claims are admitted for trial while others are not. Such criticism is 
subject to the following disclaimers. First, given a certain amount of trial 
costs, plaintiffs are treated equally ex-ante. If plaintiffs select the same 
multiplier, they face the same probability of being selected for trial. 
Second, many cases will settle before the plaintiff  files suit or selects a 
multiplier. As discussed above, risk aversion will generally induce 
settlement prior to the official filing stage. Hence, random selection only 
occurs with plaintiffs whose disputes  have not been settled prior to the 
filing stage. Third, even if some plaintiffs are left empty-handed under 
the proposed system, plaintiffs with negative expected value suits do not 
receive anything under the current procedural system. Finally, the 
proposed system does not obligate plaintiffs to select a multiplier.  
(2) The proposal is unfair to defendants. The random element of 
adjudication also impacts defendants. Defendants will face trial only if 
the claim is selected for trial. As a result, some defendants will not have 
to compensate victims and others will be forced into compensating 
disproportionately high damage awards that extend beyond the actual 
harm. This can be regarded as an unfair result. However, it is important 
to recognize that our proposed litigation system treats all defendants 
equally from an ex-ante perspective. Given a certain multiplier, all 
defendants face the same probability of trial. Of course, some defendants 
will be more fortunate than others ex-post. But it is important to 
recognize that all defendants have the option of settling the dispute  
before the plaintiff selects a multiplier.  
                                                
26 See Kakalik, J.S. et al, 1984.  
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(3) The proposal adversely affects risk-averse parties. Because our proposal 
increases the stakes, it also imposes additional risks on individuals involved 
in legal disputes. To the extent that parties are risk-averse, these risks must 
be considered as a cost of the system. The plaintiff faces the risk that his or 
her case will be eliminated at the filing stage. However, for plaintiffs that 
face prohibitive litigation costs, the risk of not being selected is an 
improvement over the certainty of not receiving any compensation at all in 
the current system.27 For a defendant in a tort case, the system imposes a 
potential cost that exceeds the actual harm inflicted on the victim. However, 
this risk can be avoided through settlement. Consider also that higher 
degrees of risk aversion increase the likelihood of settlement prior to the 
selection of a multiplier.28 
(4) The proposal will induce frivolous lawsuits and weak cases. As a 
potential drawback, our proposed system may attract frivolous lawsuits. 
Aside from frivolous suits, our proposal also makes it easier to file weak – but 
not frivolous – cases. Also, plaintiffs with very weak cases, who would 
otherwise not undertake any action, might be compelled to select a high 
multiplier in the hope that their case will be randomly selected for trial. In 
the advent of this possibility, defendants who are very risk averse might be 
inclined to make settlement offers.29  
Imposing a cap or ceiling on the multiplier may mitigate the problem of 
frivolous and weak cases. For example, plaintiffs could be limited to 
multipliers that range between 1 and 3.30 A limit on the multiplier would curb 
some of the potential abuses of the system. However, it should be noted that a 
restriction on the size of the multiplier might have the unintended effect of 
preventing some defendants with meritorious claims from creating a credible 
threat of suit.31 32 
                                                
27 Of course, even under the current situation there are situations in which a 
plaintiff with a negative expected value suit obtains a settlement amount (e.g. 
when the plaintiff has insurance for legal expenses).   
28  See also Rosenberg & Shavell, 2005, 1727-28. 
29 If judges are able to identify a frivolous suit with relative ease, abuse of the 
system could be avoided by allowing judges to punish plaintiffs who bring 
frivolous lawsuits with increased sanctions. It is questionable, however, whether 
courts are able to identify frivolous suits with great accuracy. 
30 Additionally, the system could be restricted to small claims, e.g. up to $5000. 
Alternatively, the maximum multiplier could be linked to the amount at stake: 
the higher the amount at stake, the lower the maximum multiplier. 
31 Some plaintiffs may have such substantial trial costs that the maximum 
multiplier allowed by law is smaller than the minimum multiplier they need in 
order to make their suit have a positive expected value.  
32 Note that weak cases could also be deterred by tying the multiplier to the 
merits of the case. If the court finds the case to be relatively weak from an ex-ante 
perspective but strong enough to envisage a victory for the plaintiff, the court 
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(5) The proposal will be used for lawsuits with positive expected values. 
Another point worth considering is that plaintiffs holding claims that already 
have a positive expected value might abuse the system. Such plaintiffs may 
also seek out the reduction in expected trial costs created by our proposal. 
Indeed, although some plaintiffs could potentially select a multiplier to 
increase their award, this should occur only in a limited set of cases. Our 
proposal mostly benefits plaintiffs with high trial costs. By selecting a 
multiplier, a plaintiff also incurs a risk that the case will not be selected for 
trial (inverse multiplier). For this reason, our proposed system is most 
advantageous to plaintiffs with high litigation costs. Plaintiffs with relatively 
high trial costs have more to gain from selecting a multiplier. Suppose a 
plaintiff with trial costs of $800 selects a multiplier of 2. The expected trial 
costs decrease from $800 to $400. Plaintiffs with low trial costs do not have as 
much to gain from applying a multiplier. Suppose that the plaintiff’s trial 
costs are $200. By selecting a multiplier of 2, the plaintiff gains only $100. 
Assume further that litigants are risk averse. The increased risk of not being 
allowed to go to court is worthwhile especially for plaintiffs with high trial 
costs.33    
If, for some reason, it would be necessary to restrict the system to lawsuits 
with negative expected values, this could be achieved, in theory, through ex-
ante or ex-post control by the courts. Under the ex-ante approach, 
immediately after the plaintiff selects a multiplier, the court would estimate 
whether the claim could be filed without the system. Under the ex-post 
approach, the court would, upon making a final decision, refuse to apply the 
damage multiplier if it decides that the claim would have been filed in any 
event, even without a multiplier. The latter approach creates greater risks for 
plaintiffs34 but reduces transaction costs compared to the ex-ante approach.  
(6) The proposal will increase trial expenditures. As the stakes increase, 
expenditures will rise for those cases that are selected for trial. Plaintiffs will 
now have a greater incentive to win and will therefore spend additional time 
                                                                                                               
could lower the multiplier that the plaintiff selected. An analogy exists with fee 
shifting systems that are conditional on the margin of victory: in many legal 
systems with fee shifting, indemnification awards tend to be more generous in 
cases where the loser’s legal or factual position appears weak.  
33 Notice the difference in our proposal compared to the system proposed by 
Rosenberg and Shavell (2005). Our proposal is of particular use to plaintiffs with 
high trial costs. Such plaintiffs are more likely to select a multiplier and, 
consequently, many of these cases will never make it to court. By contrast, in 
Rosenberg and Shavell’s proposal, cases are treated the same irrespective of their 
trial costs: all cases have a 50% chance of being eliminated.  
34 Also due to the fact that court officials can be expected to make errors when 
performing this task.  
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and resources to obtain (multiplied) damages. Likewise, defendants will have 
an increased incentive to win. However, it should be recognized that, due to 
risk aversion, plaintiffs will prefer a relatively small multiplier.35  Also, cases 
with higher multipliers have a lower chance of being selected for trial. 
Consequently, trial expenditures will seldom be incurred in these cases.36 
(7) The proposal will increase litigation. By converting claims with negative 
expected value into positive expected value claims, our proposed system may 
lead to an overall increase in litigation. Even if most cases settle,37 costs are 
incurred during the settlement process. Note, however, that these costs are 
mitigated, to some degree, by a number of factors. First, under our proposal, 
only a fraction of claims will be accepted for litigation. Second, some positive 
value suits that would have been litigated without our proposal will be 
eliminated if the plaintiff decides to select a multiplier.38 Third, and most 
significantly, the improved deterrence should reduce the overall accident rate. 
Finally, imposing a cap on the maximum available multiplier could restrain 
the amount of litigation.   
(8) The proposal is limited to negative-value-claims.39 Although negative-
value-claims are the exclusive focus of our proposal, it is worthwhile to 
consider negative-value-defenses as well. When a defendant’s cost of litigation 
is high relative to the benefit of the defense, it might be justified to allow the 
defendant to select a multiplier. Consider the example of a defendant who 
faces a lawsuit for using copyrighted content without requesting permission 
from the copyright holder. Assume that the defendant has a valid defense 
against the lawsuit (e.g. on the basis of the fair use doctrine).40 Suppose that 
                                                
35 Lower multipliers increase the frequency of settlement.  
36 Note that a maximum multiplier would limit the increase of expenditures in 
individual cases. 
37 The additional risks imposed by our proposal should increase the settlement 
rate because (a) the costs of risk widen the settlement range and (b) risk-averse 
plaintiffs will generally select a modest multiplier. Lower multipliers reduce the 
amount at stake, inducing additional settlements. The parties go to trial only 
when M>(Cp+Cd)/(Pp-Pd).J. Note that trial costs (Cp+Cd) are by definition 
relatively high because the plaintiff’s claim has a negative expected value.  
38 See Rosenberg & Shavell, 2005. 
39 Alternative proposals, such as the pure multiplier system, simlarly benefit 
plaintiffs exclusively.  
40 See in this context a proposal by Hamdani and Klement (2005) relating to class 
actions. In their proposal, the authors consider a collective procedure that 
consolidates claims by defendants. While the costs of bringing a suit might 
dissuade potential plaintiffs from suing wrongdoers, the cost of trial might lead 
defendants with good arguments to default or settle. It is argued that enabling 
the aggregation of claims rectifies the imbalance between a common plaintiff and 
the various defendants. To achieve defendant consolidation, the authors propose 
to implement a defence-class action device that provides class attorneys with the 
neccesary incentives to take on such cases.  
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the plaintiff, a large record company, has a 10 percent chance of winning the 
claim in court (e.g. because the court will make an error). The defendant’s 
legal fee is $15.000 and the amount at stake is $10.000. Although the 
expected judgment “only” equals $1.000, the expected loss at trial equals 
$16.000. The defendant may be willing to settle for (e.g.) $10.000. Although 
the defendant may have a valid defense, he may not find it economically 
sensible to pursue the claim in court. Allowing the defendant to select a 
multiplier strengthens the latter’s bargaining position. If, for instance, the 
defendant selects a multiplier of 5, the expected loss at trial now reduces from 
$16.000 to $4.000 (1/5x (5x0.1x10.000 + 15.000).41 42  
(9) The proposal introduces a lottery-based system of adjudication. One 
could oppose the proposal because it predicates the availability of litigation on 
the outcome of a lottery. Indeed, although deliberate randomization has a 
long lineage,43 systemic randomization in various policy areas might not be 
optimal. Randomizing, for instance, “the decision whether to receive health 
insurance,” might have the effect of destabilizing patterns of behavior, 
destroying socially valuable incentives (Samaha, 2009). However, with regard 
to law enforcement, the legal system regularly treats individuals with similar 
characteristics differently for the purpose of attaining cost savings and 
efficiency. Consider for example how the scarcity of resources for monitoring 
traffic law violations, which also applies to the broader range of law 
enforcement activities, necessitates a certain element of randomness in the 
process of handing out speeding tickets (Rosenberg and Shavell, 2005).  
 
 
5    Comparing Alternative Systems 
 
The primary goal of our proposal is to improve deterrence (where 
necessary) by turning meritorious claims with negative expected value into 
positive expected value claims. In order to prevent an increase in litigation 
                                                
41 Of course, a defendant will not select a multiplier if the additional risk costs 
outweigh the reduction in expected trial costs.  
42 Obviously if both the plaintiff and the defendant are allowed to select a 
multiplier, complications emerge. The combination of a negative-value-claim and 
a negative-value-defense may create, for instances, situations where, after the 
plaintiff selects a multiplier, the defendant picks an even higher multiplier. 
Because the normative orientation of our proposal is to resolve isssues relating to 
negative-value-claims, further examination of these interaction effects are outside 
of the scope of this article.  
43 Consider , for instance, the decision how to initiate presidential debates, to 
resolve election ties, to charter school slots, to award green card visas, etc.  
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costs and the amount of weak and frivolous claims,44 our system may need to 
impose a cap on the available multiplier.45  
In this Part we compare how our proposal, implemented with a maximum 
multiplier, performs in comparison to two major alternatives that employ 
fixed multipliers.46 In a “pure multiplier” system, the legislature selects a 
damage multiplier and litigation is not subject to any additional conditions 
(i.e. there is no conditional probability of litigation).47 In a “fixed conditional 
multiplier” system, the legislature selects a fixed multiplier and plaintiffs are 
allowed to proceed with a probability of one over the fixed multiplier.48 In 
what follows we compare both these system to our own “flexible conditional 
multiplier” proposal.49  
Although it is impossible to stipulate the optimal multiplier for each 
system,50 this Part attempts to shed light on the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the various systems. We first compare a pure multiplier 
                                                
44 For the same reasons, it also seems unlikely that parties entering into a 
contractual relationship (e.g. producers and consumers, employers and employees) 
would implement the system (without a limit) to structure their potential future 
disputes.   
45 Properly conceived, the social welfare objective is to minimize the sum of social 
costs: the harm from injury to victims, the costs of precautions, and the costs 
associated with the use of the legal system. A more comprehensive social cost 
function would also take into account risk costs and activity levels.    
46 We are grateful to the referees for suggesting a comparison between alternative 
systems. 
47 Such system was analyzed by Kaplow (1993) in a comparison with a system of 
shifting successful plaintiff’s fees. Kaplow found that relying on higher damages is 
more efficient than shifting fees since fee-shifting is inherently more valuable to 
plaintiffs with higher litigation costs.  
48 This resembles a version of the proposal of Rosenberg and Shavell (2005) who 
proposed a multiplier of 2 and an inverse probability of litigation of ½.    
49  A further comparison with other systems, such as class actions, is beyond the 
scope of this contribution. Note that, although our system and class actions may 
similarly promote certain negative value suits and improve deterrence, a major 
difference is that the scope of the class action method is limited to the claims of 
dispersed plaintiffs with correlated liability. Our system could in theory be 
applied to all kinds of claims. We can also relate our proposal to “bellwether 
trials”. In a bellwether trial procedure, a statistically significant sample of cases is 
tried before a jury and the resulting verdicts are used as a basis for remaining 
cases. Bellwether trials, as does our system, rely on probabilistic reasoning 
(although in a different way).  On bellwether trials, see Lahav (2008).  
50 Concerning the pure multiplier system, Hylton & Miceli (2005) use data from 
several RAND studies to derive an optimal deterrence multiplier for the entire 
tort system of 2. Of course, this number does not reflect the socially optimal 
multiplier (which takes into account the cost of litigation). The simulated results 
suggest, however, that “the socially optimal multipliers will often be below the 
doubling or trebling levels, and sometimes less than one”.  
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system with a fixed conditional multiplier system (5.1) and proceed to 
compare the latter system to a flexible conditional multiplier system (5.2). 
Before we commence, it is worthwhile to highlight an important advantage 
of fixed and flexible conditional multiplier systems over a pure multiplier 
system. Note that a pure multiplier system may lead to excessive 
internalization if the government does not have sufficient information about 
the distribution of trial costs of plaintiffs (relative to the amount at stake). 
The legislature may set the multiplier too high. For example, if initially only 
one out of ten injured victims would sue, and the multiplier is set at ten, this 
provides all plaintiffs with a credible threat to litigate but, at the same time, 
overall compensation will likely be over-internalized – because every plaintiff 
potentially collects ten times his or her actual damage. To avoid over-
internalization, one needs to have a clear view of the distribution of plaintiffs’ 
trial costs. This risk does not exist with fixed or flexible conditional multiplier 
systems (even if the government lacks information), since the multiplier and 
the inverse probability of litigation have a canceling effect on one another.51 52 
In what follows, we focus on other advantages and disadvantages.  
 
5.1 Pure Multipliers versus Fixed Conditional Multipliers  
 
   Assume that the legislature seeks to improve deterrence by promoting 
negative expected value suits on the basis of a pure multiplier system. 
Suppose also that the legislature is able to determine the optimal multiplier 
M (with M>1). How does a pure multiplier system compare to a fixed 
conditional multiplier model? What system achieves the highest level of 
deterrence at the lowest possible costs? A first observation is that the 
multiplier under a fixed conditional multiplier system must exceed M in order 
to obtain a similar level of deterrence. The explanation is straightforward: if 
the same multiplier is applied in both systems, the same negative expected 
value claims are transformed into positive expected ones.53 However, a pure 
multiplier system increases the expected benefits of a claim more than a fixed 
                                                
51 On optimal multipliers in a pure multiplier system more generally, see Hylton 
& Miceli (2005). The authors stress the importance of striking a balance between 
the supply of lawsuits and the need to internalize costs. 
52 Note that underinternalization is possible with all of the systems under 
discussion. 
53 This follows from the fact that Pp.M.J – Cp ≥ 0   Pp.J – Cp/M ≥ 0. In other 
words, claims that are  filed under the pure multiplier system, are also be filed 
under the fixed conditional multiplier system and vice versa. 
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conditional multiplier system (with the same M).54 It follows that a fixed 
conditional multiplier system necessitates a higher multiplier in order to 
induce an equal level of deterrence. This implies that - if we hold the plaintiff 
probability of success constant - more plaintiffs with high litigation costs will 
file under a fixed conditional multiplier system. Alternatively, if we hold the 
litigation costs of the plaintiff constant, a fixed conditional multiplier needs to 
promote a higher number of weaker claims to achieve the same level of 
deterrence.55 But fixed conditional multiplier systems also have advantages 
over pure multiplier systems. A fixed conditional multiplier system may 
greatly reduce litigation costs because it eliminates additional claims. A 
simple numerical example may demonstrate the advantages and 
disadvantages of both systems. Assume that there are 5 types of plaintiffs 
and one of each type. The plaintiffs only differ with regard to their litigation 
costs. Plaintiff of type 1 has litigation costs of 100, type 2 of 150, type 3 of 200, 
type 4 of 250 and type 5 of 300. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
plaintiff and the defendant face the same litigation costs. The amount at 
stake is 100. The probability of prevailing is 80 percent for each type of 
plaintiff. We assume that all cases are litigated.56 Suppose that the optimal 
pure multiplier is 2. As a result, plaintiffs of type 1 and type 2 will be 
motivated to sue, but not the other plaintiffs. The expected loss for the 
defendant equals 0.8 x 2 x 200 + 100 + 150= 570. The total litigation costs 
equal 2x(100+150)= 500. We can demonstrate that a fixed conditional 
multiplier system can achieve higher levels of deterrence at equal costs. 
Suppose that a fixed conditional multiplier system applies a multiplier of 4. 
As a result, all 5 types of plaintiffs will sue. The expected loss for the 
defendant equals 5x0.8x100 + 1/4x(100+150+200+250+300) = 650. The total 
(expected) litigation costs equal 1/4x2x(100+150+200+250+300)= 500. Of 
                                                
54 It is easy to see that Pp.M.J – Cp ≥ Pp.J – Cp/M whenever Pp.J-Cp/M ≥ 0 The 
proof is as follows: Pp.M.J – Cp = Pp.J – Cp + (M-1).Pp.J ≥ Pp.J – Cp + (M-1).Cp/M 
= Pp.J – Cp/M. Also: Pd.M.J + Cd ≥ Pd.J + Cp/M. 
55 Note that when both systems use the same multiplier, those relatively weak 
claims that are promoted under both systems, are promoted more strongly under 
a pure multiplier system. For example, suppose that a plaintiff has a 30% chance 
of winning in court, the amount at stake is $1,000, the plaintiff’s trial costs are 
$400, and that M is 2. Under a pure multiplier system, the expected value of the 
plaintiff’s low probability claim increases from $-100 to $200. Under a fixed 
conditional multiplier system, the expected value only increases to $100. Such a 
system would require a multiplier of 4 to obtain an expected value of $200 for this 
claim. More generally, if both systems work with different multipliers, a fixed 
conditional multiplier system with multiplier M’ promotes a claim with 
characteristics Pp, J and Cp in the same way as a pure multiplier system with 
multiplier M when M’ = Cp /(Cp – Pp.J.(M-1)). Note that when Pp.M.J – Cp > Pp.J, 
there is no M’ that will allow both systems to produce the same expected value.  
56 If not all cases are litigated, higher costs of settlement work to the benefit of a 
pure multiplier system, since more cases are filed (and thus settled) under a fixed 
conditional multiplier system (if the goal is to attain the same level of deterrence).  
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course, these examples do not prove that a fixed conditional multiplier system 
is always preferable to a pure multiplier system. It merely illustrates that it 
offers advantages in certain instances, depending on the distribution of 
litigation costs, the social costs of stimulating relatively weak claims,57 and 
the costs of settlement.  
 
5.2 Fixed Conditional Multipliers versus Flexible 
Conditional Multipliers 
How does our proposed system of a flexible conditional multiplier system 
(with a maximum multiplier) compare to a fixed conditional multiplier 
system? Most obviously, because a flexible conditional multiplier system 
allows plaintiffs to select multipliers below the maximum, fewer claims will 
be eliminated. Note, however, that plaintiffs with high trial costs are likely to 
select relatively high multipliers. Moreover, flexibility - the fact that plaintiffs 
can ask for lower multipliers - has several advantages. First, lower 
multipliers decrease the risk costs of risk-averse plaintiffs (and defendants). 
Second, plaintiffs that are relatively risk-averse may be able to extract more 
generous settlement offers if they are able to select their own multiplier 
(below the maximum multiplier). With lower multipliers, risk-neutral (or 
less risk-averse) defendants have fewer opportunities to take advantage 
of the fear among risk-averse plaintiffs- that is, that they will end up 
empty-handed.58 Similarly, it may be valuable to allow a plaintiff to select a 
multiplier below the maximum when the trial costs of the defendant are 
higher than those of the plaintiff.59 This occurs, for instance, if the stakes are 
higher for the defendant than the plaintiff, as is often the case in tort suits 
where defendants are often repeat players.60 When plaintiffs obtain larger 
settlement amounts, deterrence increases. Note further that flexible 
multipliers (e.g. maximum 2 instead of fixed at 2) do not have any effect on 
the ability to file frivolous claims. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
57 Since a fixed conditional multiplier needs a larger multiplier to achieve the 
same level of deterrence, more weak cases will be filed (see above).  
58 Note that a flexible system still allows the less risk-averse plaintiffs to choose 
the maximum multiplier. 
59 When the plaintiff expects to settle, a larger multiplier than the minimum 
multiplier benefits the defendant because expected costs decrease more for the 
defendant than for the plaintiff. 
60 See, e.g., Siegelman & Waldfogel, 1999. 
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6      Conclusion 
 
This article advances a new system that may stimulate valuable claims.  
Our proposal introduces a flexible damage multiplier which inversely affects 
the probability of adjudication. Plaintiffs are allowed to select a damage 
multiplier while, at the same time, their access to the courts is restricted with 
a probability equal to the inverse of the damage multiplier they select. While 
the expected benefits of litigation remain identical under this system, the 
expected costs decline. This increases the overall expected value of lawsuits. 
The advantages of the proposal are threefold. First, by reducing the costs of 
litigation relative to the gains, a multiplier creates a credible threat to sue for 
some individuals that would otherwise not pursue claims that have 
substantial merit. Consequently, the deterrent function of the legal system is 
improved. Second, our proposal reaches these objectives without inducing 
excessive precautions. Because the random element of adjudication is set off 
against the increased damages of the multiplier, the expected loss of a suit 
remains more or less equal for the defendant.61 Third, our proposed system 
has the advantage of providing plaintiffs the opportunity to self-select the 
optimal multiplier. The selected multiplier may strongly differ from plaintiff 
to plaintiff, and depends inter alia on risk attitudes and differences in 
litigation costs between plaintiff and defendant. 
Our proposal has certain disadvantages that can be eliminated to some 
extent. Most notably, the system may attract frivolous lawsuits and it may 
advance lawsuits involving weak claims. Also, in the process of converting 
claims with negative expected value into positive expected value claims, our 
proposal may lead to an overall increase of litigation costs. Even though most 
cases may settle in our proposed system, the parties incur costs during the 
settlement process. Still, our proposal mitigates litigation costs in a number 
of ways. First, under our proposal only a fraction of claims will be accepted for 
litigation. Second, some positive value suits, which would have been litigated 
without our proposal, will be eliminated if the plaintiff decides to select a 
multiplier.62 Third, and most significantly, the improved deterrence will 
reduce the amount of litigation due to the lower overall accident rates that 
result.  
                                                
61 This stands in contrast to systems of “pure multipliers” (without a random 
element of adjudication). Under a pure multiplier system, there is a risk that the 
multiplier will be set either too low (leading to inadequate precautions) or too high 
(leading to excessive precautions). A multiplier that brings about first-best 
deterrence must be chosen by striking a balance between the supply of lawsuits 
and the need to internalize costs. See Hylton & Miceli, 2005.  
62 See Rosenberg & Shavell, 2005. 
23 
 
Comparing our proposal to two alternative systems that involve pure and 
fixed conditional multipliers, we tentatively conclude that no system 
dominates under all circumstances. A more elaborate and refined social 
welfare model could examine the overall effect of our (and other) proposal(s). 
Such a model should take into account settlement and trial expenditures 
(endogenously determined with potential differences between plaintiffs and 
defendants), risk aversion (including potential differences between plaintiffs 
and defendants), court error, bargaining power, the social costs of litigating 
relatively weak cases, and the effects of asymmetric information.63  
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